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Abstract  
How can a small fire at a subcontractor in the USA lead to a multimillion 
dollar loss at a Swedish telephone company, and how can a single machine 
breakdown lead to a complete production stop at a production company? With 
today logistics and production trends, where terms such as Lean Production, 
Six Sigma, 5S, and World Class Manufacturing are used every day, production 
companies are introducing streamline production facilities and supply chain 
where goods and raw material are delivered just in time, where buffer zones 
are reduced, and where suppliers are reduced to a single source. These are 
trends that strengthen companies’ competitiveness, but it also makes 
companies more vulnerable to risk events.  
Volvo Powertrain in Köping is implementing World Class Manufacturing in 
Köping, and they are aware that there are risks that can harm the production 
and delay deliveries to their customers. They were looking for a tool that could 
visualize the consequences of such event to enable quick decision making. 
From known historical events and from Volvo Powertrains request, a two 
folded purpose was developed. The first purpose was to perform a risk 
assessment on the production facilities at Volvo Powertrain in Köping and to 
find and analyze risks within the factory that has a high impact on the 
production. The second purpose of this master thesis was to develop a 
simulation model for a production industry that visualizing the consequences 
of a disruption and enables quick decision making. To make this possible, a 
single case study together with the empirical quantitative-based simulation 
methods was used whilst the theoretical foundation was based on the AS/NZS 
4360: 2004 standard.  
A simulation model was developed using the probability safety assessment 
program RiskSpectrum. This required an accurate collection of information to 
reflect reality as good as possible. The information collected contained 
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historical risk events, different machine flows, different article numbers, fire 
cells etcetera, resulting in a simulation model containing almost 400 machines, 
200 machine cells, 170 article numbers, and 600 different flows. The result 
were transferred to a Excel-file making it possible for the user to search on a 
machine or article number, and to see what machine are connected to which 
article numbers, and which machine that are critical and cannot be replaced by 
a different flow in the production line. The simulation also showed that many 
articles produced are critical connected to at least one or more machines that 
cannot be replaced today by another machine or by a 3
rd 
party. 
This master thesis does not intend to speak against new logistic and production 
trends, but rather to show how important it is to develop a strategy on how to 
handle risks when a risk event occurs. By having a well-developed action plan, 
a costly risk event can turn into a business opportunity.    
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Sammanfattning 
Hur kan en liten brand hos en underleverantör i USA leda till en miljardförlust 
för ett stort svenskt telekomföretag, och hur kan ett enskilt maskinhaveri leda 
till totalt produktionsstop hos ett tillverkningsföretag? Med dagens logistik- 
och produktionstrender, där termer som Lean Production, Six Sigma, 5s, och 
World Class Manufacturing används varje dag, har tillverkningsföretagen 
introducerat strömlinjeformade och optimerade produktionsanläggningar och 
logistikkedjor. Detta medför att varor och råmaterial levereras vid behov, där 
buffertzoner är reducerade, och det totala leverantörsantalet reducerat för att 
nå single source. Dessa trender stärker företagens konkurrenskraft, men det 
gör även så att företagen är känsligare mot risker.  
Studien som står som grund för detta examensarbete utfördes på Volvo 
Powertrain som är världsledande inom produktion av tunga motorer, 
växellådor och axlar. Större delen av arbetet utfördes på plats i Köping på 
Volvo Powertrains produktionsanläggning där fokus ligger på produktion av 
växellådor. Volvo Powertrain i Köping använder sig idag av World Class 
Manufacturing, och de är medvetna om att det finns risker som kan skada 
produktionen och försena leveranser till deras kunder. De har därför framfört 
ett önskemål om att utveckla ett verktyg som visualiserar konsekvenserna av 
ett driftstopp i produktionen så att snabba beslut kan tas för att styra 
produktionen på bästa sätt.  
Från historiska händelser och efter en förfrågan från Volvo Powertrain, 
formulerades ett tvådelat syfte fram. Det första syftet var att utföra en 
riskinventering på Volvo Powertrains produktionsanläggning i Köping för att 
hitta och analysera de risker inom fabriksområdet som har en stor påverkan på 
produktionen. Det andra syftet var att utveckla en simuleringsmodell för ett 
produktionsföretag som visualiserar konsekvenserna av ett avbrott i 
produktionen som möjliggör att snabba beslut kan tas.  
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För att få fram starka och säkra resultat valdes en kombinerad strategi där en 
fallstudie tillsammans med en simulering valdes som undersökningsmetod. 
Genom att använda en fallstudie tillsammans med en simulering kan resultatet 
stärkas jämfört med att använda de två forskningsmetoderna enskilt.  
Fallstudien omfattar historiska händelser där rådata tas fram, och 
simuleringsmetoden utgår från en uppbyggd modell som representerar 
verkligheten, där olika parametrar och förhållanden kan testas. Tillsammans 
generarar de resultat som är realistiska och precisa.  
För att konstruera en simuleringsmodell var det viktigt att ha en djup förståelse 
för hur tillverkningen fungerade i Köping. Fallstudien användes för att bygga 
grunden som krävdes genom datainsamling. Genom fallstudien genererades 
kunskap om hur fabriken fungerade, vilka tänkbara problem som fanns, och 
vilka idéer som fanns för att förbättra tillverkningen. Informationen baserades 
framförallt på kvalitativ data som samlades in genom intervjuer, dokument, 
och observationer. Informationen för simuleringsmodellen baserad på 
kvalitativ data samlades in från företagspublikationer och från Volvos 
produktionssystem Volvo Production System. Den teoretiska grunden 
baserades på AS/NZS 4360: 2004 standarden.   
Simuleringsmodellen i denna uppsats är baserad på ett antal nyckelobjekt. De 
tre huvudobjekten som behövdes för att bygga en simuleringsmodell för 
produktionsanläggningen i Köping var artikelnummer, de olika maskinerna på 
produktionslinan, samt möjliga flöden för varje artikel.  
För att förstå hur produktionen fungerar och hur layouten på fabriken ser ut 
samlades data in på följande områden: 
 Fabrikslayouten 
 Produktionshastighet per artikelnummer 
 Produktflöde 
 Haverihistorik för varje maskin 
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 Kapacitetsförlust vid maskinhaveri 
 Nyckelkomponenter  
En preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) utfördes på företaget. Detta gjordes för 
att få en bild på hur verksamheten fungerade och att få fram vilka möjliga 
risker som fanns. Det första syftet med denna rapport var att identifiera och 
analysera möjliga risker som fanns på fabriksorådet i Köping. Resultatet från 
PHA:n var att modellen skulle ha möjligheten att handskas med tre typer av 
risker, den första där ett enskilt haveri slå ut en maskin, den andra ett större 
haveri som slår ut en maskincell, samt den tredje där en större olycka slår ut 
större delar av fabriken. Detta gör att simuleringsmodellen skall ha möjlighet 
att pröva olika scenarion där allt ifrån ett enskilt maskinhaveri till en större 
brand skall kunna simuleras.  
Simuleringsmodellen som togs fram i denna rapport bygger strikt på 
felträdsprincipen. Volvo Powertrain i Köping har garderat sig för möjliga 
haverier eller olyckor och har därför upp till sju olika flöden för varje 
artikelnummer. Syftet med simuleringsmodellen är att på ett enkelt sätt visa 
konsekvenserna för en riskhändelse.  
Idén till simuleringsmodellen kom från ett projekt som har utförts på de 
svenska kärnkraftverken som kallas för Common Cause Failure (CCF) där 
syftet var att se konsekvenserna av olika komponentfel med hänsyn på 
härdskador. Fördelen med att använda en felträdsmodell är att förutom varje 
maskin, kan man även lägga till andra beroenden som t.ex. transformatorer 
och inledande händelser som brand eller strömavbrott. Modellen bygger på att 
varje artikel har en toppgrind som representerar en färdig produkt. I nästa steg 
så ligger varje flöde representerat som en grind, upp till sju möjliga. Under 
varje grind som representerar ett möjligt flöde ligger sedan alla maskiner och 
beroenden inlagda i samma ordning som krävs för att tillverka artikeln. 
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 För simuleringen gjordes två olika huvudfall, ett där man tittar på alla flöden, 
och ett där man endast tittar på normalflödet. Fallet där man tittar på alla 
flöden utfördes för att hitta kritiska maskiner i produktionsflödet, och fallet där 
man tittar på normalflöde är för att hitta kritiska artiklar. Totalt lades cirka 170 
artikelnummer in i modellen med deras tillhörande flöden. Totalt blev det runt 
600 möjliga flöden och några tusen artiklar som passerar de möjliga 
maskinerna.  
För att få ett verktyg som är enkelt att arbeta i, lades alla resultat in i ett Excel 
dokument. I dokumentet finns sex olika rubriker man kan sorter efter. Dessa är 
följande: 
 Maskincell 
 Maskinnummer 
 Artikelnummer 
 Beskrivning av artikel 
 Kapacitetsförlust vid haveri 
 Artikelns tillstånd 
Man kan här välja att söka på t.ex. ett maskinnummer eller artikelnumret. Vid 
sökning på ett artikelnummer fås de artiklar fram som utnyttjar maskinen, 
både på normal- och sekundärflöde. Det går då att se vilka artiklar som blir 
kritiska om en maskin går sönder, och vilka normalflöden som påverkas. På så 
vis går det t.ex. att få fram vilka artiklar som skall prioriteras vid 
kapacitetsförlust. Det går även att söka på artikelnummer som kan vara 
intressant att göra på nyckelartiklar för att få fram vilka maskiner som är 
kritiska och på så vis ta fram redundanta tillverkningsflöden.  
Resultatet av studien visar att styrkan med denna simuleringsmodell är att den 
på ett visuellt och enkelt sätt åskådliggör konsekvenserna av en vald 
riskhändelse så att användaren lätt kan förstå situation och kan agera därefter. 
Simuleringsmodellen är även utbyggbar vilket gör det möjligt att lägga till nya 
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maskiner, artikelnummer, riskhändelser, så att den alltid är aktuell. I slutänden 
möjliggör simuleringsmodellen så att snabba beslut kan tas att för att begränsa 
effekterna av en riskhändelse och för att styra produktionen dit den behövs. 
Resultatet blir att Volvo Powertrain kan minska kapitalförlusterna som uppstår 
vid produktionsstop och höja kundnöjdheten då leveranssäkerheten till kund 
ökar.  
I framtiden skulle det vara intressant att introducera alla företag som är 
kopplade till Volvo Powertrain i simuleringsmodellen, särskilt företag i 
logistikkedjan så som underleverantörer och transporter. Detta är intressant då 
det är möjligt att se konsekvenserna om en underleverantör inte kan leverera 
när det behövs, exempelvis på grund av en brand.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Today all industrial activities are associated with risks in some ways. It’s not 
uncommon with unexpected deviation from the daily work that can endanger 
the safety of personnel, cause the release of substances that can harm the 
environment and finally disruption of production leading to loss of income 
(Wennersten, 2003). 
New trends in production and supply chain management, like Lean Production 
(Levy, 1997), has led to an increased risk of disruption due to for example 
increased complexity due to global sourcing, outsourcing, partnership that can 
lead to ripple effects in case of unexpected stops in production, company focus 
on reducing stocks and safety stocks and the introduction of single sourcing to 
reduce purchase and logistic prices (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005). An example 
of disruption is Ericsson and the fire at their subcontractor in Albuquerque, 
New Mexico (USA), which from a plant perspective was almost negligible, 
but for Ericsson it resulted in a major loss of about 400 million dollars 
primarily due to gaps in the supply of radio-frequency chips (Norrman & 
Jansson, 2004). 
Tang (2005) classifies supply chain risk management into operational and 
disruption risk. The simplest way according to Christopher and Peck (2004) is 
to divide the risks into three categories, internal to the firm, external to the 
firm but internal to the supply chain, and external to the network. These risks 
can then be further subdivided into five categories. Internal risks to the firm 
involve process and control risks. It deals with disruptions caused by problems 
within the organizational boundaries such as machines breakdowns or 
IT/communication problems (Thun & Hoenig, 2011). These problems can be 
directly influenced by the company (Rice & Caniato, 2003). Supply chain 
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network (cross-company-based) risks involve demand and supply risks. 
Demand risks relates to potential or actual disturbances to the flow of the 
product to the customers, the goal is to have the right amount of products 
sought by the customer, neither less or more. Supply risks are the upstream 
equivalent of the demand risks (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Finally external 
risks to the network involve environmental risks and these can barely be 
influenced or controlled by the organization (Kleindorf & Saad, 2005).  
1.2 Problem 
For the production industries it’s important to have a tool that can quickly 
identify the consequences of a disruption in the production chain to minimize 
the economic consequences for the industry and its customer.  
For example, Volvo Powertrain in Köping (VPK), which is an essential 
supplier for the whole Volvo Group, must always be able to deliver its 
products to their customers. If the factory cannot produce the desired amount 
of products at the right time, the risk is that they won't be able to deliver in 
time, which can be costly for both VPK and their customers. 
As many companies, Volvo Powertrain is using World Class Manufacturing 
(WCM) in their factory in Köping. WCM is a process-driven approach where 
different concepts, principles, policies and techniques are used to make 
improvements in areas such as quality, cost, lead time, flexibility, and 
customer service (Rockford Consulting Group, 1999). Philosophies and 
techniques usually associated with WCM are for example Lean Production, 
which purpose is to eliminate all non-value adding events (Liker, 2009, p. 28). 
This can be done by streamlining the production by reducing inventories, 
machines, space, staff, and even suppliers that don't add value to the customer. 
This often makes them more susceptible for risk, both in the production and in 
the supply chain (Norrman & Jansson, 2004).  
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A major problem today for the production at VPK is that some bottlenecks 
exists and when some of these machine breaks down they have an effect on 
the rest of the factory which has led to delays in production and failure to 
deliver parts to their customers. There are strategies today on how the 
production can switch flow but is hard to get an overview of the factory and 
which article numbers that are affected when a machine breaks down.  
VPK has a need to handle disruptions in a quick way, to be able to adapt to 
new situation and to have the agility needed to do that. The management for 
Volvo Powertrain in Köping has expressed a desire to find a tool giving 
correct information when a disruption occurs that enables for quick decisions 
to steer the production to the most important articles in the production chain.  
1.3 Purpose 
This master thesis has a two folded purpose. The first purpose is to perform a 
risk assessment on the production facilities at Volvo Powertrain in Köping and 
to find and analyze risks within the factory that has a high impact on the 
production.  
The second purpose of this master thesis is to develop a simulation model for a 
production industry that visualizing the consequences of a disruption and 
enables quick decision making.  
1.4 Focus and delimitations 
In this study the focus will be on internal risks which deals with disruptions 
caused by problems within the company boundaries as these problems can be 
manageable by Volvo Powertrain themselves (Thun & Hoenig, 2011). 
Volvo Powertrain has operations in Sweden, France, Japan and North- and 
South America. In this master thesis the risk analysis and action will be 
performed only on the downstream material flow to the customer for the 
facilities in Köping, Sweden. Risk factors will neither be analyzed from 
Powertrains subcontractors. 
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1.5 Disposition 
This master thesis is divided into three different parts. The first part contains 
chapter one to three and is an introduction to the research and how it will be 
carried out. The second part, chapter four will present the research and 
collected data in this report. Finally the third part, chapter five and six which 
combines part one and two, contains the results from the collected data and the 
discussion and conclusion.  
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Research Approach 
There are many different opinions about how and when too use different 
methods. Depending on a person's basic approach on knowledge, the purpose 
and goal of the research can be different (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). 
Arbnor and Bjerke (1994) has identified three different method approaches, 
the analytical approach, the systems approach and the actor approach which 
are divided into explanatory- and understanding knowledge. The difference 
between the explanatory knowledge and understanding can be difficult to 
interpret thus both system- and actors approach affects them both (Arbnor & 
Bjerke, 1994). 
2.1.1 The analytical approach 
The analytical approach strives to explain the truth of a subject as completely 
and objective as possible. It doesn’t matter if the researcher is objective or 
subjective to the research. The reason to this is that the researcher seeks to find 
the cause-effect relationships (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). Conditions for 
using the analytical approach are that there is an existing theory and a number 
of techniques, that makes it possible to verify ore falsify given hypotheses. 
More proven hypotheses will give a clearer picture of the subject. No 
comparisons of relationship are made between proven hypotheses, in other 
words, all hypotheses should work on their own without needing part or 
further explanations from other hypotheses. From the hypotheses, theories are 
produced and the result is straightforward cause-effect relationships, logic 
models and representative cases. The result should be generalized so that 
further research can be done and the researcher should be positioned outside 
the object so that it’s not influenced (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994). The preferred 
method when using the analytical approach is the quantitative, however the 
qualitative methods are also used as a validation tool (Gammelgaard, 2004; 
Mentzer & Flint, 1997).  
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2.1.2 The systems approach 
The systems approach also adopts an objective, available reality, however, 
assuming that this reality is built in a different way than the analytical 
approach (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994). According to Gammelgaard (2004), it's 
meaningless to decomposing reality into parts from a systems perspective. A 
researcher with a systems approach always tries to explain the reality in an 
objective way. In contrast to the analytical approach, the researcher considers 
the whole concept can’t be split into part where it’s possible to explain all the 
different hypotheses by them self. Arbnor and Bjerke (1994) explains that in 
the systems approach 2 + 2 + 2 = 7, this is because in reality the results will be 
made out of typical cases and some general classification mechanics, where 
unique cases can exist. The system relies on its parts and hypotheses and can 
therefore not be split up where each explanatory part explains the whole 
system. 
The relationships between parts are as important as the parts themselves. 
That's why it's important to investigate the relations between systems parts to 
be able to understand the behavior of a system (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). 
In a typical classical system approach the researcher is not directly involved in 
the object. With observation, the researcher gains information and can 
therefore propose improvements; reflect a view of reality that is objective, but 
susceptible to influence (Gammelgaard, 2004). The results are typical cases 
and some classification mechanisms, where partially unique cases may exist 
(Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994).  
Churchman (1979) points out that the ideal method to use in system analysis is 
case studies. Both quantitative methods and qualitative methods can be used in 
the system approach (Gammelgaard, 2004).  
2.1.3 The actors approach 
The actors approach places emphasis on the fact that reality is a social 
construction that is affected by people and also effects people (Björklund & 
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Paulsson, 2003). It's the youngest of the three approaches and was accepted 
first in the late sixties. The actors approach has no interests in explaining 
different events or system parts, but is oriented into understanding the social 
connections between such. This means that it's oriented to map the 
significance and meanings of different actors, their actions and the 
surrounding environment of these (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994). Gammelgaard 
(2004) states that the actors approach is highly contextual and that it is 
impossible to make predictions based on external cause-effect-relations of 
social reality due to the way humans are; intentional to different subjects. The 
results and descriptions thus given by the researcher is therefore highly 
dependent on his or hers experience and actions (Björklund & Paulsson, 
2003). To gain deeper understanding of the reality, qualitative studies are 
primarily used (Gammelgaard, 2004). 
2.1.4 Approach used in this master thesis 
This study is based on two different approaches, the analytical- and the system 
approach. The main purpose of this study is to identify possibly risks within 
the factory in Köping, and to describe the consequences if a risk occurs. This 
is a typical analytical approach where the goal is to find the cause-effect 
relationships as mentioned by (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). To be able to 
build a model of the factory in Köping, all parts of the system needs to be 
analyzed and understood. The result will be developed by using existing 
models and theories and then explain them according to the analytical 
approach. For the simulation model the relations between different parts in the 
system are as important as the parts themselves, all according to the systems 
approach (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994).  
2.2 Methodological approach 
The size of the existing knowledge in a particular research area can have 
significant effects on which type of study that need to be done (Björklund & 
Paulsson, 2003). Arbnor and Bjerke (1994) states that a research doesn’t need 
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to start with a hypothesis, and that a lot of studies aim to develop such. Those 
kinds of studies are called explorative. Explorative studies are used when there 
is little or no knowledge within a research area and the goal is to find basic 
knowledge. Descriptive studies are used when there is basic knowledge and 
understanding within the research area and the goal is to describe but not to 
explain relations (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). Explanatory studies try to 
explain a phenomenon, like "how" or "why" did this happened. The goal is to 
get a deeper understanding and in the same time be able to describe it (Yin, 
2003). The normative studies are used when there already is well-documented 
knowledge in a certain research area and the goal is to provide guidance and 
even solutions to a problem (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). 
This study is a combination of an explanative and a descriptive study. Even if 
risk management is a relatively new phenomenon in supply chain management 
and production there are many articles and information about the subject. The 
first part of this study is to identify risks and to describe them and therefore 
this meets the requirements for a descriptive study. The second part is to 
explain the consequences of a risk and to answer the questions around them, 
and this is a typical explanatory study according to (Yin, 2003).   
2.3 Research strategy 
In supply chain management it’s becoming more common to use both the case 
study research method together with the empirical quantitative-based 
simulation methods (Hellström & Nilsson, 2006). In this section the 
theoretical explanation of case study- and simulation research will be 
performed, followed by an explanation of combining both strategies.  
2.3.1 Case study research 
A case study is intended to do an in-depth explanation of an subject, especially 
when questions such as "how" or "why" appears, when it's hard to control the 
events, and when focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-
life context (Yin, 2003). It's important to know which type of question that is 
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being asked and what control the researcher has over the events. It’s also 
important to know what results that is desired and if it's possible to identify a 
defined system as focus for the research. In other words, a case study is a 
research about a specific phenomenon where the system is either important or 
represents any kind of hypothesis (Merriam, 1994). The case study describes a 
single case and the results are assumed not to be generalizing to other cases. 
Common used techniques for the case study are interviews, observation and 
content analysis (Höst, Regnell, & Runeson, 2006).  
2.3.2 Simulation research 
Bratley, Fox and Schrage (1987, ix) define simulation as “Simulation means 
driving a model of a system with suitable inputs and observing the 
corresponding outputs”. Simulations can be used for many different purposes, 
such as prediction, performance, training, entertainment, education, proof, and 
discovery. Simulations have the advantages that it allows analysis of both 
adaptive and rational agents. It also has the advantage that it’s possible to add 
new data during the whole process, and the only thing that needs to be redone 
is the simulation (Axelrod, 1997). Simulation research can be divided into two 
different classifications, axiomatic or empirical model-based research where 
the axiomatic model-based research is relying on idealized problems and 
deterministic solutions, and the empirical model-based research which is based 
on empirical findings (J Will & M. Bertrand, 2002). To be able to get a correct 
model as possible when making an empirical simulation research, it’s 
important to have great knowledge about the system that is being studied 
(Hellström & Nilsson, 2006).  
2.3.3 Combined strategy 
By combining simulation and case studies, there is a great potential of 
strengthen the result comparing to use each method alone. The case study 
method deals with events that are based on historical real-life events and 
where the data cannot be altered, while the simulation is an image of the real 
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world where the researcher can manipulate parameters and relations of 
interest. The case study can neither be replicated compared to the simulation 
which can be replicated as many time as the researcher wants. By using case 
study research, the objective is to capture realism, while the simulation 
provides the precision. Together they generate results that are realistic and 
precise (Hellström & Nilsson, 2006).  
2.3.4 Research strategy in this master thesis 
To be able to build the simulation model, great knowledge of the factory in 
Köping was needed. The case study method was used to build the foundation 
that was needed, and the collected data was inserted into a single case study. 
From this, knowledge was gathered on how the factory worked, what 
problems there were, and what ideas there were for improvements. The 
building stones for the case study were mostly based on qualitative data 
collected through interviews, documents, and observations. When the 
knowledge needed to understand the factory in Köping was achieved, it was 
possible to sketch the simulation model needed for this study. The data the 
simulation model was then based on was mainly quantitative and collected 
mainly from company publications and the Volvo Production System.   
2.4 Data collection  
There are many different methods on how to collect and process data for a 
project. Björklund and Paulsson (2003) mention a couple of scientific 
approaches and how these relate to each other. There is often a lot of 
information out there and the hardest part is often to find the relevant one.  
According to Arbnor and Bjerke (1994) there are two main techniques for data 
collection: primary and secondary. Secondary data collection uses already 
collected material, while primary data is about collecting new. To gather new 
data there are three possibilities, through direct observations, interviews and 
by conducting experiments. When using secondary data it's important to see 
that it's not written in an angle and that the author has been objective (Arbnor 
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& Bjerke, 1994). In this section a theoretical explanation of the different data 
collection methods used in this study are explained followed by an explanation 
how the data was collected for.  
2.4.1 Literature study 
A literature study is often the first step in the beginning of a research, to see 
what has already been done, to get ideas in the research area and to build a 
frame of references. The literature study refers to all form of written material; 
books, brochures, journals and websites to name a few examples. The result 
from this study is typical secondary data. It's therefore important to be aware 
of that the information might be incorrect or not complete. The strength with 
literature studies is that it can be started in short time and it doesn't need any 
specific financial resources (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003).  
2.4.2 Interviews 
A common way to gather information for a research project is through 
interviews. These can be performed in different ways, through personnel 
interviews and by phone to mention a few. It's generally seen as an advantage 
to standardize the questions, so that it's easier to compare the answers to each 
other. Within the analytical approach it's often sought, if possible, to have 
closed questions so that it becomes easier to compile the results (Arbnor & 
Bjerke, 1994).  
An advantage by using interviews is that it gives direct and new information 
about the research project. Interviews, however, are very time-consuming and 
can be costly as it may require a lot of travels. This can be eluded by doing the 
interviews by phone or other manner which doesn't require a personnel 
present. Obtained information from interviews is seen as primary data 
(Björklund & Paulsson, 2003).   
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2.4.3 Observations 
Observations can be performed in many ways. There are two common forms; 
indirectly where the observation is performed retrospectively, or directly, 
where the observation is performed in real-time (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994).  
    The observed knowledge that they   
  
 
are observed are:    
  
 
High Low   
The observers interaction  
High Participant 
observation  
Fully participant 
observation   
 with the observed are: 
Low Trivial participant 
observation Full observation   
          
Figure 2.1 Four types of observation in the present (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994) 
When performing a direct observation, four different sets of observations are 
possible as shown in figure 2.1. The researcher that performs the observation 
tries to be as integrated as possible in the group where the observed 
participants are fully aware about the observer. Data collection is done by 
doing notes or journal entries. Another way to do observation is by fully 
participate in the observed group, this is called observational research. The 
difference here is that the participants are not aware of that they are being 
observed. Also here the data is collected by notes and journal entries. The third 
kind of observation, participation observations, and the observer is integrated 
in the project without being a real part of it. The groups knows that there is an 
observer and data is collected through interviews and other open methods such 
as the "think out loud" method where the participant is asked to explain what 
he or she is thinking about when performing a task. The fourth observational 
method is the full observation, where the observer does not participate in the 
operation and is fully invisible for the subject that's being observed. Data 
collection is normally performed by using hidden technology as with a camera 
or voice recordings (Höst, Regnell, & Runeson, 2006). Observation are often 
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said to be a time- and resource-consuming data collection method, but that the 
result often are more objective than other ones (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). 
2.4.4 Data collection methods in this study 
The data collection took place at Volvo Powertrains facilities in Köping – 
Sweden during the summer of 2012. In total two full weeks, about 80-100h 
were spent on-site performing data collection. During this time several 
interviews, group meetings, observations, and documents were collected. In 
total thousands of documents, several hours of recorded interviews, and 
dozens of sketches and notes were manufactured and collected. This resulting 
into the simulation model and its results presented in this master thesis.      
The project started with a thorough literature study to see and confirm what 
has been done in this research area. The literature study also works as a 
foundation for the work that would be done in this study. Most of the data has 
been collected through secondary sources such as information from Volvo 
Powertrains databases, all according to the analytical approach. To validate the 
work and to find improvements that do not exist in the secondary data, 
interviews were performed with key personnel at Volvo Powertrain, both 
white- and blue collar personnel. In some extent observation was performed, 
but due to time needed to get reliable data it was mostly used when analyzing 
the flow of the factory and to find possible risks. In this section a thorough 
explanation on what data was needed and how it was collected will be 
performed.  
Data sources 
To be able to gather the information needed the data was collected through 
many different sources. The data was then screened and only the key data was 
kept. From the raw data, tables, production rate for key articles, and average 
numbers that was needed for the model was developed. This was done by 
performing interviews, studying documents, holding group meetings, and 
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scanning databases. In table 2.1 six data collection activities are shown, and 
these are further described in this section.  
Table 2.1  Sources for data collection 
Activity  
How many 
(estimated) 
How long 
(average) Focus of data collection  
Main interviews 
(startup of the thesis) 
3* 1-2h 
Establish context, information about 
risks and breakdowns   
Documents 10 - 
Establish knowledge about the 
production at the factory 
Company website and 
publications 
2 - 
History and information about the 
company 
Group meetings 10 30-60min 
Discussion about known problems 
and possible solutions 
Volvo Production system 
(no database pages) 
1000 - 
Breakdown history, production rate, 
material flow 
Interviews/follow up 
meetings 
Multiple 0,5 – 2h 
Confirmation about results, questions 
about data 
Observations Multiple - 
Establish context, information about 
risks and breakdowns   
*One interview was performed multiple times during the process. 
Interviews 
Three main interviews were performed during the data collection, one with 
personnel from management, one responsible for safety within the factory 
boundaries, and one with knowledge about breakdown history and critical 
machines. The questionnaires for the performed interviews can be found in 
Appendix A1, A2, and A3. 
The interview with the person from management sat the basis for the work. 
From this information it was possible to find what problem was known within 
the factory today, what tools that were needed for making faster and easier 
decisions, and information on how the organization worked. The interview 
was done with two main questions (Appendix A1), and the main purpose was 
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to have a discussion on what Volvo wanted out of this thesis. The first idea 
that was developed, which main purpose was to perform an risk inventory of 
the factory was later changed to making a visualization tool for easier decision 
making when a risk occurs. The first question that was discussed was what 
problems the management at VPK thought was a problem and possible 
disruption risk at the production facilities in Köping. The result was that there 
were a couple of known problems that needed attention, and from that the first 
idea was to perform a risk inventory of the production facilities. Later 
discussion with the risk manager it was discovered that a full risk inventory 
had already been performed within the facilities in Köping. The second task 
was to discuss what results VPK wanted, and what kind a tool that they 
thought could improve the production and ensuring deliveries to their 
customers. From the discussion it was decided that the main purpose of the 
thesis would be to develop a tool that in an easy way could visualize the 
consequences of a disruption within the production facilities so that faster 
decisions could be made to ensure production of key articles even if a 
disruption occurs. This interview was done more than once due to new 
information that surfaced during the data collection, and in total around four to 
five hours was spend on discussing the bases of the thesis.  
The second interview was with safety and risk manager at VPK. The 
questionnaires contained four main questions (Appendix A2) with the main 
purpose to find the most critical risks for the production line. This, however, 
developed into a two hour long discussion about risks and risk management at 
VPK. At this moment it was quickly noticed that Volvo had already 
researched and examined the risks and possible disruptions at the production 
site in Köping. There was already a lot of information about known risks, and 
history about disruption that had occurred in recent years. At this moment it 
was decided that, as described above, the main purpose of the study would be 
to develop a tool that would show and describe the consequences of a 
disruption within the production site. The information collected from this 
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interview laid the foundation on the layout of the simulation model. The result 
was that to be able to make lifelike simulation, not only single machines 
should be able to shut down, but also whole machine cells and areas.  
The third interview was with personnel with knowledge about the machines, 
breakdown history of those, how reparations are performed in case of a 
machine breakdown, how long a normal breakdown usually is, and what 
percentage that is caused by human error (Appendix A3). The main 
information collected from this interview contained breakdown history and the 
ratio between machine breakdown caused by wear and human error.  
Documents 
To get a better understanding on what work had been done previously, and 
projects that would be done in the upcoming future at the production site in 
Köping, documents and reports were analyzed. The information from these 
documents had no importance for the simulation model per say, but had an 
important role on explaining the production facilities, future upcoming update 
of the factory that in the future will require an updated model.  
Company website and publications 
The be able to describe Volvo Powertrain in Köping, what products they 
produce, how many and how large the facilities are, the number of employees , 
and the history of the company, the company website and information folder 
was used. This is important to give the reader an understanding on what kind 
of business the simulation model and visualization tool is based on. 
Group meetings 
During the progress of the study, new data was collected and analyzed, and to 
be able to know which information that was critical and needed, most of the 
data collected were discussed in small groups, often containing two-three 
persons, both blue and white collar personnel, and was normally around 30-60 
minutes long. The main purpose of the group meetings was to weed out all the 
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unnecessary data from all the thousands of pages of information that was 
collected, and to evaluate what data that was critical for the simulation model. 
The group meetings also had the purpose of discussing possible risks, known 
problems, and solutions with personnel in different departments with different 
tasks within the company.   
Volvo Production System (VPS) 
The be able to produce an accurate simulation model, to represent the 
production facilities in the most accurate way possible, information regarding 
article numbers such as production rate for each article number, production 
flow, breakdown history, gearbox variations and its contents, machine 
numbers,  and the layout of the factory needed to be establish. Volvo is using a 
system called Volvo Production System (VPS) which is an offshoot of World 
Class Manufacturing (Verkstäderna, 2011). All the information needed to 
build the simulation model was in databases found in the VPS. Most of the 
information found was raw data, and from thousands of reviewed database 
pages, summaries, tables, and flowcharts were either elected instantly or 
refined to suit the needs.  
Shorter interviews and follow up meetings 
Shorter interviews and follow up meetings had the same purpose as the group 
meetings, to verify collected data, to find known risks or possible disruptions, 
and to find possible improvements from the staffs, both blue and white collar 
personnel. These interviews and follow up meeting were mostly performed 
with one or two premade questions, and mostly culminated into longer 
discussion. The main purpose was to clarify and verify collected data, mostly 
from the Volvo Production System, but also to find known problems in the 
production line and to get ideas and recommendations.  
Observation  
Observation was used to analyzing the flow of the factory and to find possible 
risks. It was also used to understand the production line and how the flow 
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could be redirected during a breakdown. Observations were also used to get 
ideas for the simulation model, and when something was unclear. During the 
data collection at Volvo Powertrain in 2012 several observations were 
performed.  
2.5 Validity, reliability and objectivity 
"Using either established or more novel approaches to assessing the reliability 
and validity of research is one way of producing useful and trustworthy 
research findings" (Roberts, Priest, & Traynor, 2006, p. 45). According to 
Björklund & Paulsson, 2003 there are three dimensions on studies credibility 
that should always be considered in a scientific context; validity, reliability 
and objectivity.  
Validity means that the model doesn't have any systematical errors Wallén 
(1993), in other words, to what extent it really measures what it intends to 
measure (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). The validity technique differs a lot for 
the different system approaches and should therefore be performed in different 
ways. For the analytical approach it's important to know that the used 
measuring techniques actually measures what they should and that the results 
are adequate. For the system approach it's not as important to link theory, 
definitions and reality to each other as when using the analytical approach. An 
important way to control the validity for the system approach is to see the 
effects when applying the results indicatively. Within the actors approach 
there are no specific validation criteria. But researchers that uses the actors 
approach often say that the only validation that may occur is on which degree 
the actors accepts the results and interpretations (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1994). 
Ways to improve validity is to use multiple perspectives and to ask direct 
questions as objective as possible (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003).  
Reliability is about the possibility to get the same results regardless of how 
many times measurements are taken (Merriam, 1994). Reliability can be 
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increased by using control question where the interviewees are tested again. 
Triangulation can be used to increase reliability (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003).  
As shown in figure 2.2, the goal is to have both high validity and reliability. 
 
Figure 2.2  Illustration of validity and reliability (Björklund & Paulsson, 
2003) 
Objectivity is about how the researcher relates to the investigation, how his or 
her values might affect the result in a negative or positive way. To increase 
objectivity it's important to clarify and justify the different choices that are 
made so that the reader can evaluate the results of the study (Björklund & 
Paulsson, 2003).  
2.6 Scientific reasoning 
It's often difficult to capture social relations by using simple theories. But there 
is an urgent need to systematically address the social relationship in a 
theoretical way (Holme & Solvang, 1997). Arbnor & Bjerke (1994) shows in 
figure 2.3 the relationship between the empiric world which are full of facts, 
and the theoretical world, which are mostly quantitative build. In the models 
also three steps are described, Induction, deduction and abduction.  
With induction the researcher summarizes the regularity from observations to 
theories without having made a previous scan of known theories. In other 
words with induction a subject can be studied without the knowledge about 
existing theories or models. And from these studies new theories are 
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formulated (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). It's often underlined that when data 
is collected it should be done unconditionally. Because of this, induction has 
been criticized within the academic world thus the theory don’t contain 
anything that's not in the empirical material (Wallén, 1993). 
Deduction is on the other side a scientific method which by using general laws 
and theories makes predictions about the empirical data which is then 
compared and verified to the collected data. Conclusions are then drawn on 
separate phenomena from the existing theory (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). 
Abduction is when the researcher changes levels of abstraction between 
induction and deduction (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). 
 
Figure 2.3, illustration of inductive and deductive approach (Arbnor & Bjerke, 
1994) 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Different types of risks 
"Risk pervades every dimensions of our lives; both personnel and 
professional" (Rao & Goldsby, 2009, p. 97). Often when we talk about risks 
the first thoughts for many are risks with flying or the risk concerning nuclear 
power plant. In these branches risk management is an everyday event and 
nothing that is unknown for the workers. If we're looking only 10 years back, 
earthquakes, economic crisis, SARS, strikes, terrorist attacks has disrupted 
production and supply chains around the world (Tang, 2005). Today with large 
international companies working in many different countries around the world 
it's common to streamline the supply chain according to Lean Production, 
World Class Manufacturing etc. to lower the cost and stabilize the supply 
chain (Levy, 1997). For many companies these trends has had a good impact 
on the supply chain due to less subcontractors, less products in circulation, 
smaller warehouses and so on. These effects and trends are often very 
effective in a stable environment, but they also get more vulnerable to 
disruption caused by uncertainties (Tang, 2005), like the fire at Ericsson's 
subcontractor in Albuquerque, New Mexico (USA) or the rapidly weakening 
demand for Cisco in 2001 due to locked-in supply agreements that resulted in 
a $2,5 billion inventory write-off (Norrman & Jansson, 2004) and the toy 
manufacturer Mattel that recalled 19 million toys due to lead paint or loose 
magnets in 2007 (Sodhi, Son, & Tang, 2012). 
There are many different types of risks and they can be described in different 
ways. Sodhi et al. (2012) writes about how different risks are explained in the 
literature but that there is absence of a standard on the definition for supply 
chain risks. Manuj & Mentzer (2008) has chosen to divide the risks into eight 
different categories, where the first four are specifically associated with supply 
chains and the last four is a combination of supply, demand, operational, and 
security risks, see table 3.1.   
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Table 3.1 Summary of risks (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008, p 138) 
Type of risk Source 
 
Supply Risks Disruption of supply, inventory, schedules, and technology access; price 
escalation; quality issues; technology uncertainty; product complexity; 
frequency of material design changes 
 
Operational Risks Breakdown of operations; inadequate manufacturing or processing 
capability; high levels of process variations; changes in technology; changes 
in operating exposure 
 
Demand Risks New product introductions; variations in demand (fads, seasonality, and new 
product introductions by competitors); chaos in the system (the bullwhip 
Effect on demand distortion and amplification) 
 
Security Risks 
Information systems security; infrastructure security; freight breaches from 
terrorism, vandalism, crime, and sabotage. 
Macro Risks Economic shifts in wage rates, interest rates, exchange rates, and prices. 
Policy Risks Actions of national governments like quota restrictions or sanctions 
Competitive Risks Lack of history about competitor activities and moves 
Resource Risks Unanticipated requirements 
3.2 Risk and operational risk 
Risk is for many people a subject that still is kind of diffuse. But to be able to 
work with risk and be able to explain it, a definition of it is needed (Franzetti, 
2011). There are a lot of different standards and frameworks that can be used 
to identify, assess and manage risk. The definition for risk can also differ a lot 
between different persons and that there is a lack of a standard in the scientific 
work that has led to different approaches to risk management in different 
fields (Hubbard, 2009). 
According to the AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management standard, risk is defined as 
“the chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives” 
where the risk is measured in terms of likelihood and consequences 
(AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004). 
According to the ISO/IEC Guide 73 risk is defined as the combination of the 
probability of an event and its consequences (ISO/IEC, 2009).  
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Both these standards are well used around the world but is lacking in some 
parts according to some. Aven (2011, p725) points out that in both these 
standards the precise definition of likelihood and probability are lacking. He 
suggests that the definition should be “Uncertainty about and severity of the 
consequences of an activity or the two-dimensional combination of 
consequences and associated uncertainties”. 
Crockford (1986) provides a well-known and popular classification that 
characterizes the consequences into four different areas; trivial, small, medium 
and large. The first one, trivial consequences, is an event that occur with a 
very high frequency and have a very low severity but a very high 
predictability. The second one, small consequences, is an event that that have a 
high frequency with a low severity and a reasonable predictability, but with 
their occurrence being infrequent. The third one, medium consequences, are 
events that have a low frequency with medium severity and a reasonable 
predictability with its occurrence being frequent. The fourth and last one, large 
consequences, are events that has a very low frequency with a high severity 
and a minimal predictability (Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011).   
3.3 Risk management 
Risk management involves the work to identify and evaluate risk and how to 
handle these by introducing different routines and technical safety systems. 
There are different steps and models that can be used to simplify the work and 
making it easier to address the most critical risks for the company 
(Wennersten, 2003). The AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management standard defines 
risk managements as “the culture, processes and structures that are directed 
towards realizing potential opportunities whilst managing adverse effects” 
whilst the risk management process is defined as “the systematic application 
of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of 
communicating, establishing the context, identifying, analyzing, evaluating, 
treating, monitoring an reviewing risk” (AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004). 
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3.3.1 Aspects to consider 
When analyzing a factory, such as Volvo Powertrain in Köping or any other 
production industry, the risk management framework needs to be applied for 
all the aspects of the production flow such as the production and machine 
itself, the personnel working in the factory, outside hazards such as 
earthquakes and forest fires, up- and downstream flow outside the factory and 
the management of the company.   
3.3.2 Models and framework 
When performing a risk assessment the parameters are decided depending on 
the situation and the aim of the assessment. That means that a risk model is 
chosen or modified to fit the specific case.  
The ARM method 
One of the risk models that were used as a comparison for this master thesis 
was the Avesta Risk Management (ARM) method that was developed for the 
Avesta-Sheffield group by Ingemar Grahn and is now also used by a variety of 
companies (Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap, 1999). This method starts by 
collecting all information and knowledge about all the flows, both inside and 
outside the company. This can be done by finding hazards and other possible 
event that can make disruptions within the factory and to find other possible 
flows for the production. When all the information is collected the real 
analysis start, the data is thoroughly reviewed on spot and the results are 
assessed. With the information it’s possible for the company to protect 
themselves against risks and knowing how to mitigate the disruptions if the 
risk occurs (Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap, 1999). 
The DRISC model 
The Disruption Risks in Supply Chain (DRISC) model developed by Ulf 
Paulsson, in similarity to the ARM - method, looks at the risks from the 
companies’ perspective in the supply chain (Paulsson, 2007). Paulsson 
explains the model as "The DRISC model intend to be a holistic and generic 
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model for managing disruption risks in the product flow of the supply chain 
that helps to treat supply chain risk issues systematically" 
All risk aspects are taken into account, such as disruptions risks caused all the 
way from natural resources to the final product. It makes it possible to divide 
the risks into a total of 15 different "risk exposure boxes", of which three 
include known impact and 12 that represent expected impact. What makes the 
DRISC model to a perfect tool is that it's possible to summarize the risks into 
one number to make it easy to calculate on the total impact for the company 
(Paulsson, 2007).  
The five risk management steps 
Risk Management is a continuous process that concludes the work to identify 
and evaluate risks, and to handle these in the everyday work by introducing 
different routines and technical safety systems. The work to identify and 
evaluate different risks within the operation is called risk analysis. Risk 
assessment includes both the analysis and the evaluation whether the risks are 
acceptable or if measures need to be done (Wennersten, 2003). 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008) explain a five step model for companies with a 
global supply chain to follow, from risk identification to strategies to deal with 
these risks. This model is not only for companies with a global supply chain 
but is essentially used in all risk management (Överstyrelsen för civil 
beredskap, 1999). The five steps include risk identification, risk assessment, 
risk mitigation, risk performance and a continuous improvement process. 
The first step, risk identification (similar to risk analysis), is also the critical 
step. When doing the risk identification the aim is to discover all relevant 
risks, a bit like doing a health survey, and then to evaluate if the risk is 
relevant for the whole system, and therefore need further assessment (Kern, 
Moser, Hartmann, & Moder, 2012). The second step, the risk assessment, is 
more focused on the in-depth analysis of each risk to be able to effectively 
avoid it, reduce its probability and impact and to accept its occurrence or in the 
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cases where the business impact is too big to prepare a contingency plan 
(Baird & Thomas, 1985). The third step, risk mitigation, uses the data from the 
first two steps to find countermeasures for each risk. When talking about 
mitigation, there is two different ways to do it, either before the risk event, or 
after it, also called contingency plans. For each risk that may cause 
interference in any way, an appropriate mitigation strategy needs to be 
developed and executed. The fourth step, continuous improvement process, is 
a process that is continuously ongoing and affects all the steps in this model. 
After the mitigation is done, even if it was successful, to control the risk it’s 
important to continuous monitor it and to analyze the effectiveness of the 
chosen mitigation strategy and if needed to adjust these measures for future 
risk management (Kern, Moser, Hartmann, & Moder, 2012). The fifth and 
final step is the risk performance. Risk management is a continuously ongoing 
process. It’s therefore important that chosen measures is carried out, and not 
only the analysis. Risk management can be costly, both in effort and in money, 
often new investments, new routines, and above all, a new way to look at 
things. This is often up to the company management to take those decisions 
(Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap, 1999). 
3.4 Risk analysis 
3.4.1 Probabilistic safety analysis/assessment (PSA) 
A probabilistic safety analysis is an analysis of probabilities that may occur 
and is used to find common cause failures that can burst all the barriers if a 
breakdown or accident occurs. Watson (1994, p. 261) explained it as “A 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis expresses uncertainty about the possible future 
damaging consequences of complex installations,…, PSA may be seen as a 
tool for argument, rather than an objective representation of truth”. What 
makes the PSA into a powerful tool is that in one model the whole system, 
with all the barriers and safety system may be analyzed. The result is thus a 
complete picture over the whole system. The problem with PSA is that it treats 
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rare events and thus the statistical uncertainty can be big (Swedish Nuclear 
Power Inspectorate, 2001). In this master thesis the PSA will be used to 
calculate the frequency of events that can lead to disruption in the production, 
to find disturbances, component failures and malpractices that has the biggest 
effect on the production, and finally to find possible safety improvement 
measures and which of these to priority.  
3.4.2 Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis is together with event tree analysis the most common 
methods for detailed risk management (Holmgren & Thedéen, 2003). It's 
today used in many branches such as the nuclear industry, air and space 
industry and the chemical industry. It's widely accepted today due to the usage 
as part of the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) for improving the safety of 
nuclear power plants and the safety of the space missions (Cepin, 2011). In a 
fault tree analysis the model is based on an assumed accident/breakdown as 
the top gate. From here the goal is to find underlying events and causes that 
can lead to the top gate. In the nuclear industry the top gate can be a meltdown 
of the core, and the goal is to find common cause failures that can lead to this 
meltdown (Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, 2001). In figure 3.1 an 
example of a fault tree model is shown, this is just an example chosen due to 
its simplicity, but the same principals applies for the Volvo Powertrain model. 
The top gate is failure to deliver water to tank A for four hours. The top gate is 
an “AND” gate, which means that all of the underlying events, in this case GA 
and GB, needs to break down for the top gate to fail. GA and GB on the other 
hand are “OR” gates, which means that it's enough that one of the underlying 
event occurs/breaks down for the gate to fail. So for gate G to occur at least 
one of the following basic events A1 - A4 together with at least one of B1 - B4 
need to occur/break down. If each basic event has a probability to occur it's 
also possible to calculate the possibility for the top gate to occur (Holmgren & 
Thedéen, 2003).  
28 
 
 
Figure 3.1 fault tree analysis (Cepin, 2011) 
 
Figure 3.2 fault tree symbols (Cepin, 2011) 
3.4.3 The risk matrix 
There are many risks out there for a production company and not to overflow 
with data a first good step is to use the risk matrix to find which risks are most 
critical for the company. The risk matrix is built by two axes, the first one 
representing how often this risk may occur. The second one represents the 
consequences if the risk occurs. In the first rough analysis different check list 
can be used to identify known risks? The problem is often to calculate on risk 
that is unknown for the company. To find these a "what if"-analysis can be 
used (Holmgren & Thedéen, 2003). To know where to put the risks on the risk 
matrix a definition can be used: Risk = probability (of the event) multiplied 
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with the Business Impact (or severity) of the event (Norrman & Jansson, 
2004). The risk matrix has three different areas, the red one representing event 
that instantly needs a solution. The second step, the yellow, is risk that needs 
to be locked at as soon as possible but they don't represent any critical threats 
to the company. The third and last step is the white one, which are risk that 
doesn't have a real impact on the company, these risk should be noticed but 
they don't need any instant actions, see figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3  The risk matrix  
3.4.4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis – PHA 
A preliminary hazard analysis - PHA is used to find risk and harmful event in 
the beginning of a project (Johansson & Lundin, 1999). It's a semi-quantitative 
analysis that can be used to identify risks and harmful events and to rank this 
according to their severity and finally identify possible solutions on how to 
control these hazards and follow-up actions (Rausand, 2005; Department Of 
Defense, 1993).  
3.4.5 Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) is commonly used to analyze potential 
failures, predicting their effects, and facilitating preventive action. Usually 
equipment is selected for analysis, the next step is to identify potential failures 
that could affect the system it belongs to, and to analyze whether the 
equipment is critical for the system or not. The failure modes are the possible 
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ways in which the equipment can fail. Effect analysis involves predicting the 
effects of each failure mode (Braaksma, Meesters, Klingenberg, & Hicks, 
2012).  
3.5 Risk mitigation, recovery and protection plans 
3.5.1 Mitigation strategies 
To reduce the impact on disruptions, environments and to people, risk 
mitigation measures are used. This can be done by several actions such as 
mapping of hazards, insurance and legislation and structural and non-structural 
measures.  
Risk mitigation is a way to minimize the impact of a risk event and should be 
based on the risk assessment to be able to address known and unknown 
problems that may occur in the best way. Risk mitigation can be seen in two 
ways, long term and short term. Long term mitigation can for example be 
structural and non-structural defenses such as improvement of buildings and 
infrastructures or changing the relation of critical locations and areas and 
education of people, in other hand changes that is done before an accident. A 
short term risk mitigation measure is about improving the response and actions 
when a risk has occurred so that the impact can be reduced (Esteban, 
Delmonaco, & Ferrara, 2011). For each risk that is relevant for the company, 
an appropriate mitigation strategy needs to be done. (Kern, Moser, Hartmann, 
& Moder, 2012) 
3.5.2 Recovery plans 
If the risk should occur it's important to have a recovery plan so that facilities 
or operations are up and running as fast as possible so that critical services or 
product deliveries still can be performed. This can be done by following the 
examples on page 31. 
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 Have backup suppliers that can deliver the needed resources if the 
accident occurs at the sub-supplier 
 Re-deploy personnel where it's needed 
 Decide whether to repair or build a new facility or to relocate to 
another site if a structural incident occurs 
 Find the resources necessary for restoring business operations 
 Return to normal operations 
 Resume the operation levels as they were before the disruption 
(Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2012) 
3.5.3 Protection plans 
There are many ways a company can protect themselves against risks. Manuj 
and Mentzer (2008) have identified seven strategies on how to protect a 
company from risks which are the following: avoidance, postponement, 
speculation, hedging, control, sharing/transferring, and security. For many of 
these strategies is often mandated the use of another strategy to make them 
work properly.  
Avoidance 
Avoidance is just as the name explains, a way for the company to avoid risks. 
This is often bound to a certain product or geographical market. Avoidance 
can for example be to delay entry for a product or to only release a product in 
low uncertainty markets. (Miller, 1992) 
Postponement 
Postponement is about delaying the usage of resources so that the company 
can be more flexible and less money bound in resources. Two different types 
of postponement are mentioned by Zinn and Bowersox (1988), Form 
postponement and time postponement. Form postponement includes 
manufacturing, assembly, packaging and labeling while time postponement 
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refers to the movement of the gods from the factory to customers only after the 
orders are received.  
Speculation 
Speculation is the opposite the postponement. In contrast to postponement, 
speculation decisions are made on anticipated customer demands. (Manuj & 
Mentzer, 2008) 
Hedging 
Hedging is a way of lowering the risk for event such as currency fluctuation or 
natural disasters. The idea is to have a number of suppliers, spread out in the 
world so if a risk occurs it will not affect all of the suppliers. Dual sourcing or 
multiple contracting is a good example on how a risk can be hedged. (Manuj 
& Mentzer, 2008) 
Control 
Miller (1992) explains controlling as ways companies may seek to control 
contingencies from the different risk sources instead of passively treat those 
risks. Control strategies are commonly used within organizations and can 
included vertical integration, increased stockpiling and to use buffers or 
maintaining overcapacity in the production, handling and transport, and finally 
storage. (Jüttner, Peck, & Christopher, 2003) 
Transferring/Sharing Risk 
To transfer or to share risks in a supply chain, achievement can be done by 
outsourcing, off-shoring and contracting to other firms. By outsourcing or off-
shoring the risk is transferred from the company to the supplier. (Manuj & 
Mentzer, 2008) 
Security 
Security strategies is about finding and identifying nuclear, chemical, and/or 
biological element when shipping products. This is done today by hi-tech 
sensors that are capable of identifying such elements. The meaning is to sort 
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out what is moving and concentrate risk shipments so that the rest of the 
shipments can be dealt with.  
3.6 Operational risk management 
Operational risk management can be described as a decision-making process 
to systematically evaluate events that may occur so that actions can be taken to 
best determine the course of action for any given situation. (Phillips, 2000) 
Operational risk has been around as long as businesses have been around. 
Every company is confronted with operational risks because the operation 
involves different type of processing, such as manufacturing or development. 
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events. 
(Franzetti, 2011) 
3.6.1 Models and framework 
There are many different definitions of the Operational Risk Framework. 
Some are simpler and some explains better on how to proceed. Franzetti 
(2011) has made a comparison of the models that is commonly used in 
operational risk management, the Basel Committee, the COSO, and finally the 
AS/NZS 4360: 2004 as shown in table 3.2. Since this study is based on the 
AS/NZS 4360: 2004, it will be described further in section 3.6.2.  
  
34 
 
Table 3.2 Comparison of risk standards (Franzetti, 2011) 
AS/NZS 4360: 2004  COSO ERM Basel 2 
Establish the context 
Internal environment, 
objective setting (implicit) 
Identify risks Event identification Identify 
Analyze risks Risk assessment Assess 
Evaluate risks Risk assessment (Measure) 
Treat risks 
Risk response and control 
activities Control/mitigate 
Monitor and review Monitoring Monitor 
Communicate and consult 
Information and 
communication (implicit) 
 
3.6.2 The AS/NZS 4360: 2004 risk management process 
The AS/NZS 4360: 2004 standard involves seven steps as shown in table XX2 
and further described in picture 4.3.1. Three of the seven steps in the model 
are the risk assessment steps. Further down an explanation of the seven steps 
are performed in the order as the AS/NZS 4360: 2004 presents them.  
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Picture 3.4 The AS/NZS 4360: 2004 steps 
Communicate and consult 
Communicate and consult are important through all the steps in the model. 
Effective external and internal communication is important to a company so 
that the right decision are made, both before and after a risk event occurs. 
Stakeholders should be consulted all the way rather than a one way flow of 
information from the decision makers to other stakeholders. 
(AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004) 
Establish the context 
To be able to begin with the risk management process, the basic parameters 
must be defined on which risk that must be managed. This also sets the scope 
for the rest of the process. This step includes five sub steps which includes 
establishing the following steps: the internal context, the external context, the 
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risk management context, to develop risk criteria's, and to define the structure 
for the rest of the process. (AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004) 
Identify risks 
As the name suggests, this step is about identifying the risks that need to be 
managed. This step is important and needs to be performed in a well-
structured way, so that no risk misses to be identified and therefore not 
included in later analyses. Risk that is identified should both be those that are 
under control and those that are not. To be able to do a good risk identification 
the following sub steps should be used; what can happen, where and when?, 
why and how it can happen, and tools and techniques to use so that those risks 
can be found. (AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004) 
Analyze risks 
Risk analysis is the step where the goal is to understand the risks that may 
occur, whether it needs to be treated and what engagement to use. To be able 
to know how to engage the source of the risk need to be found together with 
its consequences regardless if they’re positive or negative, the likelihood of 
these risks. Risk is the combination of consequences and likelihood. The risk 
analyzes starts with evaluating the existing control within the organization. 
When the risk is found its likelihood and consequences are calculated. The risk 
analyzes can use a variety of methods, depending on the needed detail, such as 
qualitative analyzes, semi-quantitative analyzes, and quantitative analyzes. To 
test the risk analyzes the potential controls a sensitivity analyzes are made. 
(AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004) 
Evaluate risks 
From the result of the risk analyzes, evaluations needs to be done so that a 
decision about which risks need to be treated and which ones to prioritize. 
Comparing the results from the risk analyzes with the risk criteria that was 
established when the context was considered, is the main part of risk 
evaluation. (AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004) 
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Treat risks 
Risk treatment is the step where the possible options for treatment, assessing 
these options and the preparation and implementation of treatment plan. 
Included in risk treatment are identifying options for treatment of risks with 
both positive and negative outcome, assessing the risk treatment options and 
preparing and implementing treatment plans. (AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004) 
Monitor and review 
To be able to ensure that the management plan remains relevant throughout 
the work, an ongoing review is essential. Factors and other things may change 
during while the work is performed, and it’s therefore necessary to repeat the 
risk management cycle regularly. Included in the monitor and review step is to 
learn lessons from the risk management process. (AS/NZS4360:2004, 2004) 
3.7 Summary of Literature review 
The Australian and New Zeeland standard AS/NZS 4360: 2004 has been the 
model which this master thesis is based on. One of the main parts of this study 
is to perform a risk assessment of the production facilities in Köping. The risk 
assessment according to the Australian and New Zeeland standard AS/NZS 
4360: 2004 contains of three steps; identify risks, analyze risks, and finally to 
evaluate risks. To be able to perform the risk assessment and to produce an 
accurate simulation model, a preliminary hazard analysis (PRA) together with 
a risk matrix will be used to determine what risks that is important for this 
study. 
To be able to evaluate risks within the factory in Köping, a fault tree analysis 
(FTA) simulation model will be built in the probability safety assessment 
(PSA) program RiskSpectrum. RiskSpectrum PSA is developed by 
Scandpower and is an advanced fault tree (FT) and event tree (ET) software 
that is used in half the nuclear power plants around the world (Scandpower, 
2012). 
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4 Volvo Powertrain description 
4.1 Volvo Group  
Volvo Group is a world leading manufacturer of trucks, busses, construction 
equipment (CE), drivetrains for marine and industrial applications, and 
components for aircraft and aircraft engines. Volvo Powertrain Operations is a 
part of Volvo Groups Trucks Operation that has over 35 000 employees at 46 
factories and 60 logistics centers around the world. Volvo is working hard on 
their core values to ensure a better future. This involves quality, safety, and 
environmental care. (VolvoGroup, 2012) 
4.2 Volvo Powertrain Operations 
Volvo Powertrain is responsible for the development and manufacturing of 
heavy engines, gearboxes and axles for the Volvo group. Volvo Powertrain is 
also a well-established manufacturer of large gearboxes, with manufacturing 
facilities in Köping – Sweden, and in Hagerstown - USA. A total of 9000 
people are employed at Volvo Powertrain around the world.  
Volvo Powertrain in Köping where this study was performed was founded in 
1856. In the beginning it was called Köpings Mekaniska Verkstad but was 
bought by Volvo in 1942. The production facilities occupies 93 000 square 
meters and has around 1200 employees. The different products produced in 
Köping are divided into three main areas, Gearboxes SMT/AMT (Figure 4.1), 
Gearbox Powertronic (Figure 4.2), and Marine gears (Figure 4.3). 
(VolvoGroup, 2012) 
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Figure 4.1 Gearboxes SMT/AMT 
 
Figure 4.2 Gearbox Powertronic 
 
Figure 4.3 Marine Gears 
4.3 Volvo case description 
The simulation model that is developed in this thesis is built on a number of 
key elements. There were three main elements that were needed to build a 
SMT/AMT Gearboxes 
Produced for: 
 Volvo Trucks 
 Renault Trucks 
 Volvo Busses  
 Volvo Parts 
 UD trucks 
 Mack trucks 
 
Gearbox Powertronic 
Produced for: 
 Volvo CE 
 Renault Trucks 
 Volvo Parts 
 
Marine Gears 
Produced for: 
 Volvo Penta 
 Volvo Parts 
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simulation model of the production line. These elements were the different 
article numbers, the machines needed to produce those, and possible flows for 
each article number. To be able to understand the production and how the 
layout of the simulation model should be designed, the following information 
was needed: 
 Layout of the factory 
 Production rate per article number 
 Production flows 
 Breakdown reports for every machine 
 Production capacity loss  
 Parts of importance for producing gearboxes 
All sections mentioned above will be further described in this chapter. Due to 
confidentiality all the numbers and tables in this chapter are fabricated 
examples whose purpose are to explain what material was needed to be able to 
develop the simulation model and visualization tool.  
4.3.1 Layout of factory 
To be able to produce an accurate simulation model and visualization tool of 
the factory, the layout of the factory had a key importance due to fire cells and 
other key objects within them that could change the outcome of a simulation. 
If only a single machine was modeled within the simulation model, larger 
events such as fires, power outage or other larger events that could knock out 
an entire fire cell or larger areas of the factory could not be simulated, and 
therefore not included in the visualization tool. 
Production lines at Volvo Powertrain in Köping 
The factory is divided into nine different production lines, where every line 
has its own breakdown reports, production rate etcetera. The nine areas 
include both production and assembly. Warehousing and contract production 
are included in the simulation model, but they lack representative data due to 
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the high amount of information needed to make an accurate model of those. 
Warehousing and contract production are also outside the production facilities 
and that was also a reason not to include those in an accurate way.  
Fire cells 
A fire cell is a delimited part of a building where a fire can developed during a 
prescribed minimum time without spreading to other parts of the building. A 
fire cell should be delimited from the building, either through walls and joist, 
or in other ways such a sprinkler system in an open building. The purpose of 
the fire cell is to protect adjacent fire cells or buildings during the prescribed 
minimum time. In a production line area within a factory, a fire cell normally 
contains a couple of machine cells. Therefore it’s important to have the ability 
to simulate fires than can disrupt whole fire cells (Boverket, 2008). 
 
Figure 4.1  Fire cell containing four machine cells 
Machine cell  
An example of a machine cell is shown in figure 4.1. This one contains four 
different electric machines and is operated by a robot. Each machine is a part 
of a larger machine cell in each area. For the simulation model it’s important 
to represent both the single machine, and linking it to its machine cell. This is 
important because it’s possible that a lot of machine cells might not be able to 
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operate even if only a single machine breaks down. From the collected data 
there were almost 400 machines that were put into the simulation model, and 
in total almost 200 machine cells 
 
Figure 4.1  Machine cell containing four machines (CIM, 2010) 
4.3.2 Production rate 
To illustrate the production line, only showing the article number in the 
visualization tool wouldn’t make understanding of the production line better. 
To understand the consequences of a disruption each article number should 
also be represented in its yearly production rate, so it will be easier to see 
which components which are more important than others. This was the first 
data collected, and included production rate for the articles in the factory. All 
article numbers that had been produced in the factory at Volvo Powertrain in 
Köping since the beginning of the year was included. Each article number and 
its production rate was collected and inserted in a table, such as the example 
show in table 4.1. The two columns “days with receipts” and “number of 
parcel” is included in the model because it’s included in the production rate 
database. Because those two columns are not important for the simulation 
model or the visualization tool, they can be excluded if a cleaner and easier 
understandable visualization tool is wanted. 
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Table 4.1  Production rate example (fabricated numbers) 
Article number 
 
Days with receipts 
 
Number of produced 
items between 110601 
- 120601 
Number of parcel (pallets) 
between 110601 – 120601 
 
Article 1 
 213 321331 650 
Article 2 155 252175 516 
Article 3 231 222970 549 
Article 4 123 136811 523 
Article 5 122 121982 612 
Article 6 89 89388 445 
Article 7 221 87756 1162 
Article 8 167 86522 226 
… … … … 
Article 170 23 632 45 
 
4.3.3 Production flow 
One of the key data that was needed for the model was the main production 
flow, and possible flows, for each article number that is produced in the 
factory. Each article that is produced at Volvo Powertrain in Köping is 
dedicated a main flow. But to reduce the consequences of a breakdown, most 
articles that is produced also has one or more, up to seven different flows that 
can be chosen if needed. In total almost 600 flows for around 170 articles were 
modeled for the simulation model. The data needed for the flows were 
collected through databases in sheets, like the example shown in table 4.2 for 
article 91234. In this example, the article number has four different flows, with 
the normal flow being represented by flow A (N=normal). To make this article 
in the production it needs to go through eight different processes, including 
withdrawal raw material from the warehouse and assembly, before it’s ready 
to ship to its customers. The table shows that if a machine breaks down, for 
example Facing tool B, the normal flow can’t be used but by moving the 
process to Facing tool A or to an subcontractor, the article can still be 
produced.  
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Table 4.2  Example production flow sheet 
Article 91234 
Machine  
Flow A (Normal 
flow) Flow B Flow C Flow D 
WITHDRAWEL 
WAREHOUSE 
X X X X 
LATHE A X X     
LATHE B     X X 
DRILL A X X X   
DRILL B       X 
CUTTER A X   X   
CUTTER B   X     
CUTTER C       X 
OVEN A     X X 
OVEN B X X     
FACING TOOL A   X X   
FACING TOOL B X       
SUBCONTRACTING       X 
ASSEMBLY X X X X 
 
4.3.4 Breakdown reports 
To be able to produce a model that can calculate the probability of a machine 
failure, every breakdown that has occurred in the factory needs to be logged 
and saved in databases. Both machine breakdowns caused by wear and human 
error, and larger events needs to be included. The more information there is 
about breakdowns such as how often they occur and why, the better the 
accuracy of the probability will be.  
The data contained errors from a number of different areas in the factory. The 
data was divided into number of errors, number of the total errors that was 
caused by human error, and the downtime per machine. All the breakdowns 
that were collected were divided into groups, and an average breakdown report 
was performed for each area within the factory, such as the example in table 
4.3. For model produced for VPK, the table contains two different sections; all 
reported errors and errors that were longer than 0.01 hours but less than 48 
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hours. This was done because all repots were not accurate, and those that had 
an abnormal downtime, both very short and very long, are only included in the 
total breakdown and should be compared to the one excluding events shorter 
than 0,01 or longer than 48 hours. The problem with this is that real 
disturbances that were longer than 48 hours are excluded, and for better 
accuracy a better screening of the breakdown reports can be done.  
Table 4.3  Example of breakdown per factory machine cell (using 
fabricated numbers) 
Department Area A Area B Area C Area D Area E Area F Area G Area H Total Average 
All reported 
errors:                     
Number of 
errors 152 211 75 87 173 351 298 311 1658 226 
Human 
errors 12 29 undef 26 undef 115 undef undef 191 38 
Average 
downtime 
(h) 2,12 6,14  5,98 9,30 12,51  7,33 6,65  18,65  
 
8,76 
Errors over 
0.01h and 
under 48h                     
Number of 
error 144 253 53 177 136 334 244 298 1639 204 
Average 
downtime 
(h) 8,15 5,84 2,73 8,08 1,7 5,98 1,6 6,19   5,26 
 
4.3.5 Production capacity loss 
Volvo Powertrain has performed an activity base cost analysis (ABC) of the 
factory. In the ABC analysis it’s possible to see the loss of capacity if a 
machine breaks down. This information was not possible to get for all 
machines, but for those that the data was collected it’s then imported to the 
model. For those machines that did not have capacity loss numbers, the row is 
left empty.  
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4.3.6 Parts of importance for producing gearboxes 
To make it easier for the management of Volvo Powertrain to take decision on 
how to control the flow after a disruption, each article number was 
interconnected with every different gearbox model it is used in. 
A large amount of different gearboxes are produced in Köping for a number of 
different manufactures. An approximation of the different variation of 
gearboxes are shown table 4.4.  
Table 4.4  Gearbox variations 
Gearbox product class Approximated variations Manufacturer 
04-TLV 80 Volvo Trucks 
24-HDV 80 Volvo Trucks (new platform) 
25-RT 80 Renault Trucks 
23-HDV 76 Renault Trucks (new platform) 
05-HDV 10 Nissan 
11, 12, 13-BUSS 64 
Brazil busses, Prevost and Borås 
(Volvo) 
28-HDV 13 MACK 
 
In every product class there is a number of different gearbox families such as 
AT2412D, AT2612D, and ATO2612D and so on. Each gearbox normally 
contains around 300 article numbers and is presented in a list as the example 
shown in table 4.5. For each gearbox an assembly sheet containing all the 
needed articles for each gearbox variation were collected. With a total of 
around 400 different gearbox variations, containing around 300 article 
numbers, the total number of connections that would have to be done, would 
be around 120 000. Because of the large number of gearbox variations and its 
article numbers that they contain, only the top 20 gearboxes were chosen for 
the simulation model in this study. This can easily be extended in the future so 
all the variations would be represented in the simulation model and 
visualization tool.  
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Table 4.5  Example of gearbox components sheet (using fabricated 
numbers) 
Gearbox: AT26XXD   
Number Article number Description 
1 946212 Flange screw 
2 946551 Sprocket split M AX,S 
3 986530 Circlip T=3.2 
4 975532 Roller bearing 
5 981002 DISTANCE RING T = 9:54 
6 982310 PIPE OIL FILTER 
7 914556 SPROCKET HP-MX 
8 912544 SPROCKET BACK-BX 
9 965440 OIL DISTRIBUTOR Main Shaft 
… … … 
296 995440 Bracket 
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5 Results and discussion 
5.1 Risk Assessment at Volvo Powertrain in Köping 
The first step in identifying risks was made with a preliminary hazard analysis 
(PHA) of the company. The reason for this was to review the activities within 
the organizations and to map possible risks and harmful events in the 
beginning of this study. Every event is calculated based on consequences and 
frequencies, where the results are presented in a table and then put into the risk 
matrix. In this study the PHA was used to find and evaluate the most common 
risks within a production line, so that the model could be used for both smaller 
and larger event.  
A PHA example divided into four different parts is presented in table 5.1. The 
Scenario is describing the reason for the risk. The Initiating event is describing 
how the event occurs. The Probability is qualitative, and is divided into three 
levels; low, medium and high. Low means that the risk barely or never occurs, 
medium that sometimes happens and high that means that the risk event often 
occurs. The Consequence describes what happens if the risk occurs, this 
section is also divided into three levels. Low means that smaller disruptions 
within in production may occur. Medium means that the stop time is longer 
but concerning a smaller part of the factory. High means that the stop time is 
really long or that the event affects a larger part of the factory and production.  
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Table 5.1  Example of PHA table (using fabricated numbers) 
SCENARIO Initiating event Probability Consequence  
A. Machine stop 1. Fire taking out 
single machine 
Medium Medium Planned maintenance 
and similar on the machine will 
not have high consequences in the 
production except for the 
downtime. Breakdowns and 
similar events can have a big 
impact on the production due to 
uncertainties of the downtime. 
Human error can either lead to 
requirement of repairs or shorter 
stops.  
 2. Power outage Medium 
 3. Breakdown by wear 
or similar 
High 
 4. Human error High 
 5. Planned High 
B. Breakdown of 
machine cell 
1. Breakdown of one 
or more of the total 
eight main 
transformers 
Low High Fire often has a high 
consequence on the production. 
Installed fire protection lowers the 
probability but if the risk occurs in 
can have a large impact.   2. Fire taking out the 
entire machine cell 
Medium 
 3. Water damage 
caused by sprinklers 
Medium 
C. Long downtime 
because of large 
accident 
1. Longer Power 
outage 
Low/medium High Longer power outage and 
similar large events will have a 
massive impact on the production 
and can be difficult to protect 
against.  
 2. Large fire that takes 
out large parts of the 
factory 
Low 
 3. Natural disasters Low 
5.1.1 Scenarios in the PHA 
Through the PHA many other risks were established and analyzed. Because 
the focus of this master thesis is about production disruptions, risks that were 
found outside the production facilities that did not have an impact on the 
production per say, were not included in the model. The risks that was found 
when performing the PHA of the production facilities in Köping but that are 
not shown in table 5.1, are not further described in this chapter due to 
confidentiality. The three chosen risk scenarios chosen are described further 
below.  
Machine stop 
The first and most important scenario for the model is machine stop due to 
breakdowns or other events. Breakdown on single machine due to various 
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reasons, are probably one of the most common disruption in production today, 
and therefor it’s important to be able to simulate the effects of such event. The 
consequences are normally medium, but the probability is high and thus makes 
it important to know the fallout of a machine stop event. Typical events that 
disrupt a machine are breakdown caused by wear, human error, power outage, 
fires, and planned stops due to maintenance or preventive upgrades.  
Breakdown of machine cell 
The second scenario that is used in the model is breakdown of machine cell. 
Due to the fact that many of the machines within the production line are paired 
with other machine, resulting in machine cells, there is a possibility that a 
disruption occurs that could knock out the entire cell. The probability is minor 
comparing to single machine stop, but the consequences are higher, and 
therefore important to include in the analyses. Typical disruptions for a 
machine cell are similar to the ones for single machines; breakdown caused by 
wear, human error, power outage, fires, and planned stops due to maintenance 
or preventive upgrades.  
Long downtime due to larger accidents 
The third scenario, downtime caused by larger accident is the last scenario that 
is included in the analyses. Large accident can be describe as longer power 
outage, fire that takes out larger parts of the production line, and natural 
disasters such as flooding or extreme weather causing structural damage. 
Overall the probability is low, but the consequences are so severe that 
excluding them from the analysis should lower the reliability of the thesis 
event thus no larger events as those describe above have not yet taken place at 
the facilities. Unlike the first two scenarios, this one is not interesting to 
include in the simulation, thus the consequences for the short time production 
are already know to be severe, but are included in the PHA to highlight the 
risk.   
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5.1.2 The risk matrix 
After establishing the preliminary hazard analyses, a risk matrix was used to 
establish which risk content that would be needed in the model. As seen in 
table 5.1; A3, A4, A5, B2, B3 and C1 were the risks that had the highest 
consequence/probability for this example. The conclusion of the data from 
Volvo Powertrain in Köping showed that it was important to be able to close 
down single machines, as well as a whole machine cell to be able to get the 
most correct data out of it.  
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Figure 5.1  The risk matrix  
5.1.3 Discussion risk assessment  
The first purpose of this study was to identify and analyze possible risk 
elements within the factory boundaries that had a high impact on the 
production, all according to the Australian and New Zeeland standard 
AS/NZS4360:2004. This is called internal risks and involves processes and 
control risks and Thun and Hoenig (2011) explained it as disruptions caused 
within the organization boundaries such as machines breakdowns or 
IT/communication problems. Rice & Caniato (2003) explained it as problems 
that can be directly influenced by the company. The first step was therefore to 
identify all risks at Volvo Powertrains facilitys in Köping. This followed the 
first risk assessment step in the Australian and New Zeeland 
AS/NZS4360:2004; Risk Identification. Information about risks were collected 
from both databases containing historical events, and by performing 
interviews with key personnel. The results showed that Volvo Powertrain had 
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recently performed a precise risk identification and a thorough analysis on 
these risks and their impact on the factory. It can be concluded that further 
investigations couldn’t find any new risks that were thought to have a possible 
high impact on the factory. On the other hand, while the risks were known, 
there was a desire from Volvo Powertrain in Köping to find a way to visualize 
the consequences of a risk event, so that quick decision could be made to limit 
the impact and to steer the production to where it was needed. The knowledge 
was already there, but spread out in different departments, which resulted in 
longer lead time for information.  
The second step was to evaluate which risk that were thought to have a high 
impact on the production at the facilities in Köping, all according to the 
second step, Analyze Risks, in the risk assessment in the Australian and New 
Zeeland standard  AS/NZS4360:2004. Most risks that were found in the risk 
identification performed by Volvo Powertrain, were risks that didn’t directly 
threaten the production, and were therefore not intresting to include in the 
simulation model. 
By perfoming interviews with people working on the production floor and 
people from the maintenance department, together with breakdown reports, the 
possible risks that were thought to have an impact on the production were 
selected, all according to the third step, Evaluate Risks, in the Risk Assessment 
in the Australian and New Zeeland standard AS/NZS4360:2004.The possible 
risks that was found important for the production was the result of the risk 
assessment and were added in the simulation model.  
5.2 Simulating disruptions 
The model developed for this master thesis is strictly a fault tree model. Volvo 
Powertrain Köping has already thought of possible breakdowns and failures in 
the production and most article numbers has possible routes, up to seven 
different, if a machine breaks down or other events occurs. This simulation 
models main purpose is to highlight the consequences of possible risk event.  
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In this section a description how the model, called the Volvo Powertrain 
Disruption Visualization Tool (VPK-DVT) were developed, from the planning 
stage, how the model was build, and how it works.  
5.2.1 Planning of the model 
The idea for the model came from projects performed at the Swedish nuclear 
power plants, called Common Cause Failure (CCF). The idea in the nuclear 
power plant project was to build up the whole reactor, with all the components 
included in the safety system, and then to simulate and find components that 
can lead to loss of cooling, and in the end a core meltdown. The first step was 
to discuss if it was even possible to use a nuclear probability safety assessment 
program for a production line. From this discussion it was clear that it hadn’t 
been done before and therefore the purpose of the thesis changed to try the 
possibilities by using such model for the production industry. The possibilities 
of using such accurate program are that it’s possible to get answers on 
consequences in a quick and easy way when the model is done. It is also 
possible to calculate accurate probability numbers, and in the future to expand 
the model so it can include more departments, external operations, and more 
products etcetera. 
To be able to build the production line, knowledge from the nuclear power 
plant project showed that the main components needed to do such model was 
the machines in the factory, the different flows, and to link article numbers to 
these parameters.    
5.2.2 Developing the model 
The simulation model inputs are based on the different article numbers that are 
produced within the facilities at Volvo Powertrain in Köping. Each article 
number are presented in the model as a top gate, either an OR gate for 
simulating consequences on the normal flow, or an AND gate so simulate the 
overall consequences of all the flows within the factory for each article 
number, see Figure 5.2. It’s enough if one basic event in any transfer gate to 
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fail to get the whole top gate to fail if it’s an OR-gate. With an AND-gate, all 
the transfer gates or the basic events need to fail for the top gate to fail For 
example, if the normal flow in figure 5.3 breaks down, there are still two 
different flows that may be used if the broken machine is not in the other 
possible flows. 
In Figure 5.3 en example on how the top gate for an article number can be 
seen. The top gate is described with the article number and a name for it, in 
this case a main shaft with the article number 1234567. This top gate is an 
AND-gate and is used for simulating the consequences for all the flows as 
described above. It has three transfer gates that represent three possible flows 
(Operations) than can be used. In this case the normal flow is dedicated to 
operation two. For the top gate to stop functioning (not possible to produce 
that article number), all three flows (operations) must be true (broken down). 
Each transfer gate contains the machines (basic event) in the right order 
needed to produce the top gates article number. The second keystone needed 
for the simulation model is the machines needed to produce each article 
number. Each machine is dedicated a unique basic event, describing both what 
kind of machine it is, and the machine dedicated number and machine cell, see 
Figure 5.4. The first number, LM44 describes which machine cell the machine 
belongs to, and the other number is the machine number and is unique for each 
machine. 
 
Figure 5.2  Fault tree symbols (Cepin, 2011) 
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Figure 5.3  Top gate for an article number. In the model over 160 such as 
this exist  
 
Figure 5.4  Basic event dedicated to a machine  
Each transfer gate has the same layout as shown in figure 5.5 and represents 
the machines that are included for that flow. As can be seen the transfer gate is 
now the top gate, in this case an OR-gate which means that if one basic event 
fails, the top gate fails. In the model the machine is put into the right order in 
the production chain, starting with bringing the raw material from the 
warehouse, to the last operation sending the article to assembly or straight to 
their customers. As can be seen in the picture, the machine (basic events) is 
put horizontally order connected by empty gates and each gate under the main 
operation (transfer gate) is an “OR”-gate which means that if one machine 
breaks down, the whole operation breaks down. In total there are almost 400 
different machines in the model divided into almost 200 different machine 
cells.  
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The advantage of using a fault tree model is that in addition to each machine, 
it’s also possible to include the machine cell, transformers, and other initiating 
events. All these additional events are represented with a basic event that is 
placed in the same horizontal level as the machine it connected to. This makes 
it possible to see the consequences of events that are not just related to specific 
machines, but also events that are related to larger areas of the factory. An 
example of using basic events for initiating event can be seen in figure 5.5, 
where the extra basic events represent fire/breakdown of a machine cell, and 
failure of the main transformer.  
 
Figure 5.5  Operation flows and basic event  
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The reason why two different simulation are done, the on concerning all flows 
for the specific article number, and the one only concerning the main flow, is 
that if the normal flow is disrupted most of the time a production decline will 
occur. In total around 170 article numbers were added to the model, and each 
article number has its own fault tree, where each transfer gate represents a 
different flow, resulting in almost 600 different flows and a couple of thousand 
article numbers passing through different machines. 
5.2.3 Scope of the model 
Volvo Powertrain in Köping has over 300 articles that are produced within the 
factory, though many are produced in quantities less than a couple of hundred 
each year. Because of this only around half, the ones thought to be the most 
important and most produced articles, are chosen in this model.  
The risks that will be analyzed in this master thesis are those that effect the 
production within the factory. Therefore demand and competitive risks will 
not be included.  
5.2.4 Verification and validation 
Verification can be defined as whether a simulation model is a correct 
representation of the conceptual model. Validation can be defined as a 
determination of whether the simulation model represents the real system and 
thus can be a substitute for experimentation (Banks, 2000). 
It must be emphasized that that the simulation model is not scientifically 
validated. However in simulation terms a face validation has been performed 
with key personal at Volvo Powertrain in Köping, all according to (Banks, 
2000). The simulation model and its assumptions were discussed through 
several meetings with different people, and the results were also comparable to 
historical event that had occurred.  
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5.2.5 Simulation results 
To represent possible outcomes of possible risks, two different types of 
simulations were done. The first simulation represents a bigger breakdown, 
fire or similar event that knocks out the entire machine cell. For this the whole 
machine cell is included, which for example can be all the machines starting 
with AV03 (see figure 5.6). In total 194 simulations were done, three more 
than the amount of machine cells due to the lack of names for three of the 
machines. The second simulation represents a smaller breakdown, fire or 
similar event that knocks out a single machine. For this a simulation was done 
for each machine, in total 381 simulations.  
The simulation is performed by turning the state of a basic event from normal 
to true, see figure 5.7. When the state is turn to true, it represents that the 
machine or machine cell in question is out of order by breakdown or other 
similar events. In the Basic Event properties box shown in figure 5.7, different 
attributes can be chosen, such as the probability of a breakdown.  
When a machines or machine cells state is turned to true, the simulation result 
will be all the article number that is effected by that machine or machine cell. 
For example, if a breakdown simulation of machine cell AV03 is wanted, the 
state is turn to true, and the simulation is then run. The output data will result 
in a list of article number that is affected, as can be seen in Table 5.2. There 
are three different outcomes, Critical, Normal Flow, and Not Critical. Critical 
means that all the different flows are affected, and therefore the article cannot 
be produced in any way. Normal flow means that the normal flow is affected, 
but that the secondary flows are still intact. That means that there will 
probably be a production decline, but the article can still be produced. Not 
critical means that the machine is part of a secondary flow and doesn’t affect 
any normal flows. Normally that machine only becomes critical together with 
the breakdown of another machine. The capacity loss states how much 
capacity is lost if the machine breaks down. In some areas in the production 
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there can be redundant system, which means that a machine cell can have a 
number of similar machines performing the same task. In case of one of the 
machine breaks down the capacity loss might only be 50% for example. 
Therefore the machine is not critical as long as both the similar machines don’t 
breaks down at the same time.  
To make it easier and faster to find the simulation result, all the data was 
exported to an excel document with the same layout as in Table 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.6  Basic Event list 
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Figure 5.7  Basic event properties 
Table 5.2  Simulation results from breakdown of machine cell AV03 
(fabricated) 
Cell Machine number Article number Description 
Capacity loss at 
breakdown State 
AV03 AV03___________80525 Article A DRIVHJUL  100% Critical 
AV03 AV03___________80525 Article B TRYCKPLATTA  100% Critical 
AV03 AV03___________80525 Article C TANDHJUL, MEDBRINGARE 100% Critical 
AV03 AV03___________80525 Article D KOPPL.RING 3-4:AN 100% Normal flow 
AV03 AV03___________80525 Article E KOPPL. RING 3-4:AN 50% Normal flow 
AV03 AV03___________81542 NOT CRITICAL … 100% Not Critical 
 
5.2.6 Result list from the simulation 
After all the simulations were performed for both single machines and 
machine cells, including Critical, Normal Flow, and Not Critical events, a list 
was generated including all the machines. In total about 70 % of the machines 
became critical for one or more article numbers. The result is that there are 
some bottlenecks in the production that are of such importance and that there 
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are no redundant systems that can coop with a breakdown or similar event that 
knocks out a machine or machine cell. The result list, with a similar layout as 
Table 5.2, included over 2000 events connecting machines to different article 
numbers. Because of confidentiality no detailed explanation or description of 
the result list will be performed. 
5.2.7 Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
The simulation model doesn’t take into account whether a machine really is 
critical for the system or not. In the simulation model all machine within the 
factory boundaries are modeled. That means for example that a lift that feeds a 
machine with materials might turn out to be critical in the simulation results, 
but in reality it can be replaced by a forklift if needed. A Failure Mode Effect 
Analysis could be used to determine whether a machine really is critical or 
not. This will not be performed in this thesis thus it’s not part of the purpose. 
This however is something that could be interesting to perform in the future.  
5.2.8 Discussion simulation model 
The second purpose was to develop and test a simulation model for a 
production industry (Volvo Powertrain in Köping) that could visualize the 
consequences of a disruption so that quick decision making could be possible. 
By using the Probability Safety Assessment (PSA) program RiskSpectrum 
(Scandpower, 2012) it was possible to investigate if there were any strength 
and advantages by using a tool developed for the nuclear industry, where risk 
management for obvious reason have a big impact on the organization and 
have more stringent requirements comparing to other industries such as 
production. To make the simulation model for Volvo Powertrain in Köping 
(VPK) as accurate as possible, a case study was performed to deal with events 
that had happened in real-life, gathering data from historical events. It was 
also a key to understand how the production performed and what flaws it had. 
With this information the simulation model for Volvo Powertrain in Köping 
was developed. The case study combined with the simulation resulted in a 
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study that was realistic and precise that represented the production facilities 
well, just as described by (Hellström & Nilsson, 2006). 
The simulation model in this master thesis is modeled in the same way as it’s 
done on the CCF project on the Swedish nuclear power plant. The idea of 
developing a simulation tool in RiskSpectrum came from an ongoing project at 
the Ringhals nuclear power plant outside Varberg in Sweden. The project was 
about finding critical Common Cause Component Groups (CCCG) in the 
various safety systems. For this all the safety systems were modeled in a Fault 
Tree (FT) model, including main components such as pumps, valves, diesel 
generator, and all the way down to smaller sub components such as pump 
motors, relays, and breakers. Included in the model was also signals and power 
supply. The purpose was to find components in the different safety systems 
that could knock out all the safety system and result in a core meltdown.  
The results in this study demonstrated an advantage by using an accurate PSA 
tool used by the nuclear industry as it enables the user to analyze a system in 
depth, including both main components, subcomponents, and other systems 
such as the power grid. This is a great advantage comparing to other 
simulation programs such as Simul8 (SIMUL8, 2013) where only the machine 
or machine cell can be represented. This means that with the PSA tool it’s 
possible to find common cause failures (CCF) and other events that can turn of 
a specific object, such as a motor breaker in a machine. This is exactly what 
happened at Forsmark Nuclear Power plant in 2006, where a short circuit in 
the 400kV switchyard outside the power plant, resulted in a severe voltage 
fluctuation which spread into several of the electrical systems in the plant, 
resulting in a reactor scram and most of the safety systems being knocked out 
on reactor 1. This was partly due to common cause failures (CCF) (KSU, 
2007).  
Another advantage is that the simulation model can develop over time, adding 
new machines, article numbers, and even new functions such as the probability 
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of a breakdown for each machine. This is one of the key strength of simulation 
studies according to (Axelrod, 1997). For Volvo Powertrain in Köping this 
means that by simulating events and adding the probability based on historical 
events, it’s possible to calculate the needed spare-parts inventory, to seek out 
bottlenecks and other areas that might need improvement, or at least make 
specific action plans on what to do if a risk event occurs. 
The strength with the FT model is that all the connection and flows are 
represented in the model, connecting machines to different article numbers, 
different areas within the factory, and possible risks and the probability of 
those. This makes it possible to see how all the machine and article numbers 
are connected, and how they depend on each other. This means that the overall 
strength with the simulation model in this study is that the results shows the 
consequences in a fast and in a comprehensible way when a machine, machine 
cell, or a fire cell gets unavailable because of breakdowns, fire, and other 
events. The user can choose to turn off certain machines and see what 
consequences it will have on the production. To make the simulation model 
easier to use, the results from the different simulations performed, were 
transferred to an Excel document as a visualization tool. This was performed 
so that it would be easier to use, and enable more users to use the results from 
the simulation without having access to RiskSpectrum. With the Excel 
document the user can choose a machine or machine cell, turn it off, and then 
see what article numbers that are affected. The result is color coded on green, 
yellow, and red, where green represents machine that are not critical, yellow 
where the normal flow of an article is affected, and red which represents that 
the machine is critical for that article number. The color codes make it easier 
for the user to visualize how critical the effects are. With one touch of a button 
the user receives what article numbers are affected and how serious it is.  
The weakness with using a Fault Tree model in the Probability safety 
assessment program RiskSpectrum is the lack of visualizing of the flow and 
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the production like other programs as for example the logistic and production 
simulation program Simul8 (SIMUL8, 2013). Programs such as Simul8 has 
the advantage that it shows the flows within the factory as a picture on the 
screen, and when a machine breaks down it shows where the flows move if 
there is a secondary flow, or if it stops. RiskSpectrum only shows the 
consequences as numbers. RiskSpectrum also has the disadvantage that time 
automatically cannot be represented in the simulation model. This means that 
the simulation model itself cannot generate production losses in numbers. This 
can instead be achieved by using an excel-document where production data is 
connected to the machines and article number from the simulation model. In 
this study this was done by adding the connections and consequences from the 
simulation model to the production history sheet, resulting in the visualization 
tool produced for Volvo Powertrain in Köping as shown in Table 5.2.  
However, the purpose of the simulation model in this study was to show the 
consequences of possible risk events, and to show how all the machine and 
article numbers interact with each other, allowing for a better and faster 
decision making to steer the production to where it’s needed. For example it 
can be discussed if the consequences of the fire at Ericsson subcontractor in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico (USA), which resulted in a major loss of about 
$400 million dollars because of gaps in the supply of radio-frequency chips, 
could be prevented or at least be alleviated if Ericsson knew the consequences 
before the accident. With the simulation model developed in this study, 
Ericsson could have had the knowledge needed to prevent such disaster, and 
maybe even taking advantage of the situation. By knowing the consequences 
and to have an action plan, a risk event can turn from being a major loss to a 
market possibility for a production company (Norrman & Jansson, 2004).   
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6 Concluding remarks 
6.1 Conclusion 
Today with large international companies working in many different countries 
around the world it's common to streamline the supply chain according to 
Lean Production, World Class Manufacturing etc. to lower the cost and 
stabilize the supply chain (Levy, 1997). For many companies these trends have 
had a good impact on the supply chain due to fewer subcontractors, less 
products in circulation, smaller warehouses and so on. These effects and trends 
are often very effective in a stable environment, but they also get more 
vulnerable to disruption caused by uncertainties (Tang, 2005). This makes it 
very interesting to find out the consequences on different events and how 
vulnerable a company is to possible disruptions.  
The simulation model developed in this master thesis and tested on Volvo 
Powertrains production facilities in Köping, shows that it’s important not only 
to know what possibly risks that exist, but also what the consequences are of 
those risks. The strength of the simulation model is that it visualizes the 
consequences of chosen event so that the user can easily understand. The 
simulation model is also extendable which makes it possible to add machines, 
articles, and risk events, so that it’s always up to date. In the end it enables so 
that quick decision could be made to limit the impact and to steer the 
production to where it’s needed. 
6.2 Contribution 
The contribution of this master thesis is mainly to Volvo Powertrain where the 
developed and validated simulation model enables production and operational 
managers to easily and quickly run the model in order to take critical 
decisions. Those critical decisions can be which article that shall be given 
priority when a machine breakdown occurs in the production and there is 
limited capacity, but also to find out which articles that is affected by the 
breakdown.  
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The result from the simulation model also highlights critical machines in the 
production line and where bottle necks might occur in a breakdown situation. 
All this information was known before but had never been demonstrated.  
This simulation model also shows the strengths by using fault tree models. 
Building a correct model takes time and needs a lot of background information 
and data. But with a verified and validated model the results are accurate and 
easy to understand, and the result doesn’t require long simulation hours. For 
other practitioners in supply chain or production management, the fault tree 
model is a good way of highlighting the consequences and results of a 
breakdown or crisis situation. That is the reason why it’s a well-known tool for 
risk managers.  
6.3 Future possibilities 
In the future it would be interesting to add all companies connected to Volvo 
powertrain, especially companies in the supply chain, such as subcontractors. 
This is interesting because it makes it possible to see the consequences on the 
Volvo Powertrains production if a supplier can’t deliver parts when it’s 
needed.  
Other future possibilities are to perform a Failure mode effect analysis 
(FMEA) on all the machines added to the simulation model. As described in 
section 3.4.5, machines that are found critical in the simulation might not be 
critical in real life. The simulation model doesn’t take into account if a 
machine is critical for its task. For example, a lift that is feeding a lathe might 
in real life be replaced with a forklift for a short time to perform its task, and 
on the other hand an oven might not have any replacement that can perform its 
tasks. With a failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) the importance of each 
machine and its task can be found, and thus the focus on solutions can be on 
the machine that are really critical for the production.  
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The probability of a machine failure is known thanks to breakdown reports 
performed during a long period. This makes it possible to perform a deeper 
analysis of each machine and to calculate the inaccessibility, called an 
availability analysis. This is performed by using the following formula: Q = λ 
* β, where Q = inaccessibility, λ = failure rate (failures/hour) and β = 
reparation time (hours). From here it’s possible to perform a cost analysis to 
calculate the costs of a machine breakdown with all possible flows included. 
This is calculated with the formula Y = Q * Z, where Y = total cost, Q = 
inaccessibility (see above) and Z = the total value of produced items for a 
specific machine. With this information it’s possible calculate what each 
machine breakdown cost, and to rank what machines cost the most in 
production loss per year, and to link this to possible future investments for 
redundancy or to use 3
rd 
party companies as backup. But the most important 
information given by the availability analysis and cost analysis is the 
possibility to prioritize repair work where it’s needed the most at the given 
time.  
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Appendix  
A.1 Interview questions with management 
Question 1: What known problems are there today? 
 
 
Question 2: What problems have existed with the production within the 
organization? 
 
 
Question 3: Which articles are the most important ones? 
 
 
Question 4: What results are Volvo looking for in this master thesis 
 
 
Question 5: Open discussion 
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A.2 Interview questions with risk department 
Question 1: What kind of risk management is carried out on Volvo Powertrain 
today? 
 
 
Question 2: What kind of accident has occurred in the past? 
 
 
Question 3: What known risk is there at Volvo Powertrain today? 
 
 
Question 4: Open discussion 
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A.3 Interview questions with maintenance department 
Question 1: What known problems are there in the production at Volvo 
Powertrain today? 
 
 
Question 2: Which machines are considered to be the most critical? 
 
 
Question 3: Are strategies for maintenance and repairs being developed? 
 
 
Question 4: How are spare parts and other material being stocked? 
 
 
Question 5: Open discussion 
 
 
 
